Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           T. Tsao
Request for Comments: 7416                                  R. Alexander
Category: Informational            Eaton's Cooper Power Systems Business
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                M. Dohler
                                                                 V. Daza
                                                               A. Lozano
                                                Universitat Pompeu Fabra
                                                      M. Richardson, Ed.
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                            January 2015
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           T. Tsao
Request for Comments: 7416                                  R. Alexander
Category: Informational            Eaton's Cooper Power Systems Business
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                M. Dohler
                                                                 V. Daza
                                                               A. Lozano
                                                Universitat Pompeu Fabra
                                                      M. Richardson, Ed.
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                            January 2015

A Security Threat Analysis for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPLs)




This document presents a security threat analysis for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPLs). The development builds upon previous work on routing security and adapts the assessments to the issues and constraints specific to low-power and lossy networks. A systematic approach is used in defining and evaluating the security threats. Applicable countermeasures are application specific and are addressed in relevant applicability statements.


Status of This Memo


This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.


This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

本文件是互联网工程任务组(IETF)的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查,并已被互联网工程指导小组(IESG)批准出版。并非IESG批准的所有文件都适用于任何级别的互联网标准;见RFC 5741第2节。

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at


Copyright Notice


Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

版权所有(c)2015 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents ( in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件,因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本,并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。

Table of Contents


   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Relationship to Other Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Considerations on RPL Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Routing Assets and Points of Access . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  The ISO 7498-2 Security Reference Model . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Issues Specific to or Amplified in LLNs . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  RPL Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Threat Sources  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Threats and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Threats Due to Failures to Authenticate . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.1.1.  Node Impersonation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.1.2.  Dummy Node  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.1.3.  Node Resource Spam  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.2.  Threats Due to Failure to Keep Routing Information
           Confidential  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.2.1.  Routing Exchange Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.2.2.  Routing Information (Routes and Network Topology)
               Exposure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.3.  Threats and Attacks on Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.3.1.  Routing Information Manipulation  . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.3.2.  Node Identity Misappropriation  . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.4.  Threats and Attacks on Availability . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       6.4.1.  Routing Exchange Interference or Disruption . . . . .  18
       6.4.2.  Network Traffic Forwarding Disruption . . . . . . . .  18
       6.4.3.  Communications Resource Disruption  . . . . . . . . .  20
       6.4.4.  Node Resource Exhaustion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Relationship to Other Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Considerations on RPL Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Routing Assets and Points of Access . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  The ISO 7498-2 Security Reference Model . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Issues Specific to or Amplified in LLNs . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  RPL Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Threat Sources  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Threats and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Threats Due to Failures to Authenticate . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.1.1.  Node Impersonation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.1.2.  Dummy Node  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.1.3.  Node Resource Spam  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.2.  Threats Due to Failure to Keep Routing Information
           Confidential  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.2.1.  Routing Exchange Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.2.2.  Routing Information (Routes and Network Topology)
               Exposure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.3.  Threats and Attacks on Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.3.1.  Routing Information Manipulation  . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.3.2.  Node Identity Misappropriation  . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.4.  Threats and Attacks on Availability . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       6.4.1.  Routing Exchange Interference or Disruption . . . . .  18
       6.4.2.  Network Traffic Forwarding Disruption . . . . . . . .  18
       6.4.3.  Communications Resource Disruption  . . . . . . . . .  20
       6.4.4.  Node Resource Exhaustion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   7.  Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     7.1.  Confidentiality Attack Countermeasures  . . . . . . . . .  21
       7.1.1.  Countering Deliberate Exposure Attacks  . . . . . . .  21
       7.1.2.  Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks  . . . . . . .  22
       7.1.3.  Countering Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       7.1.4.  Countering Remote Device Access Attacks . . . . . . .  23
     7.2.  Integrity Attack Countermeasures  . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       7.2.1.  Countering Unauthorized Modification Attacks  . . . .  24
       7.2.2.  Countering Overclaiming and Misclaiming Attacks . . .  24
       7.2.3.  Countering Identity (including Sybil) Attacks . . . .  25
       7.2.4.  Countering Routing Information Replay Attacks . . . .  25
       7.2.5.  Countering Byzantine Routing Information Attacks  . .  26
     7.3.  Availability Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       7.3.1.  Countering HELLO Flood Attacks and ACK Spoofing
               Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       7.3.2.  Countering Overload Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       7.3.3.  Countering Selective Forwarding Attacks . . . . . . .  29
       7.3.4.  Countering Sinkhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       7.3.5.  Countering Wormhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   8.  RPL Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     8.1.  Confidentiality Features  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     8.2.  Integrity Features  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     8.3.  Availability Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     8.4.  Key Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   Acknowledgments  . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   7.  Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     7.1.  Confidentiality Attack Countermeasures  . . . . . . . . .  21
       7.1.1.  Countering Deliberate Exposure Attacks  . . . . . . .  21
       7.1.2.  Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks  . . . . . . .  22
       7.1.3.  Countering Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       7.1.4.  Countering Remote Device Access Attacks . . . . . . .  23
     7.2.  Integrity Attack Countermeasures  . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       7.2.1.  Countering Unauthorized Modification Attacks  . . . .  24
       7.2.2.  Countering Overclaiming and Misclaiming Attacks . . .  24
       7.2.3.  Countering Identity (including Sybil) Attacks . . . .  25
       7.2.4.  Countering Routing Information Replay Attacks . . . .  25
       7.2.5.  Countering Byzantine Routing Information Attacks  . .  26
     7.3.  Availability Attack Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       7.3.1.  Countering HELLO Flood Attacks and ACK Spoofing
               Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       7.3.2.  Countering Overload Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       7.3.3.  Countering Selective Forwarding Attacks . . . . . . .  29
       7.3.4.  Countering Sinkhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       7.3.5.  Countering Wormhole Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   8.  RPL Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     8.1.  Confidentiality Features  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     8.2.  Integrity Features  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     8.3.  Availability Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     8.4.  Key Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   Acknowledgments  . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
1. Introduction
1. 介绍

In recent times, networked electronic devices have found an increasing number of applications in various fields. Yet, for reasons ranging from operational application to economics, these wired and wireless devices are often supplied with minimum physical resources; the constraints include those on computational resources (RAM, clock speed, and storage) and communication resources (duty cycle, packet size, etc.) but also form factors that may rule out user-access interfaces (e.g., the housing of a small stick-on switch) or simply safety considerations (e.g., with gas meters). As a consequence, the resulting networks are more prone to loss of traffic and other vulnerabilities. The proliferation of these Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), however, are drawing efforts to examine and address their potential networking challenges. Securing the establishment and maintenance of network connectivity among these deployed devices becomes one of these key challenges.


This document presents a threat analysis for securing the Routing Protocol for LLNs (RPL). The process requires two steps. First, the analysis will be used to identify pertinent security issues. The second step is to identify necessary countermeasures to secure RPL. As there are multiple ways to solve the problem and the specific trade-offs are deployment specific, the specific countermeasure to be used is detailed in applicability statements.


This document uses a model based on [ISO.7498-2.1989], which describes authentication, access control, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation security services. This document expands the model to include the concept of availability. As explained below, non-repudiation does not apply to routing protocols.


Many of the issues in this document were also covered in the IAB Smart Object Workshop [RFC6574] and the IAB Smart Object Security Workshop [RFC7397].


This document concerns itself with securing the control-plane traffic. As such, it does not address authorization or authentication of application traffic. RPL uses multicast as part of its protocol; therefore, mechanisms that RPL uses to secure this traffic might also be applicable to the Multicast Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (MPL) control traffic as well: the important part is that the threats are similar.


2. Relationship to Other Documents
2. 与其他文件的关系

Routing Over Low-Power and Lossy (ROLL) networks has specified a set of routing protocols for LLNs [RFC6550]. A number of applicability texts describe a subset of these protocols and the conditions that make the subset the correct choice. The text recommends and motivates the accompanying parameter value ranges. Multiple applicability domains are recognized, including Building and Home and Advanced Metering Infrastructure. The applicability domains distinguish themselves in the way they are operated, by their performance requirements, and by the most probable network structures. Each applicability statement identifies the distinguishing properties according to a common set of subjects described in as many sections.


The common set of security threats herein are referred to by the applicability statements, and that series of documents describes the preferred security settings and solutions within the applicability statement conditions. This applicability statement may recommend more lightweight security solutions and specify the conditions under which these solutions are appropriate.


3. Terminology
3. 术语

This document adopts the terminology defined in [RFC6550], [RFC4949], and [RFC7102].


The terms "control plane" and "forwarding plane" are used in a manner consistent with Section 1 of [RFC6192].


The term "Destination-Oriented DAG (DODAG)" is from [RFC6550].


Extensible Authentication Protocol - Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) is defined in [RFC5216].


The Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) is defined in [RFC5191].


Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode is defined in [RFC3610].


The term "sleepy node", introduced in [RFC7102], refers to a node that may sometimes go into a low-power state, suspending protocol communications.


The terms Service Set Identifier (SSID), Extended Service Set Identifier (ESSID), and Personal Area Network (PAN) refer to network identifiers, defined in [IEEE.802.11] and [IEEE.802.15.4].


Although this is not a protocol specification, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] in order to clarify and emphasize the guidance and directions to implementers and deployers of LLN nodes that utilize RPL.


4. Considerations on RPL Security
4. 关于RPL安全性的思考

Routing security, in essence, ensures that the routing protocol operates correctly. It entails implementing measures to ensure controlled state changes on devices and network elements, both based on external inputs (received via communications) or internal inputs (physical security of the device itself and parameters maintained by the device, including, e.g., clock). State changes would thereby involve not only authorization of the injector's actions, authentication of injectors, and potentially confidentiality of routing data, but also proper order of state changes through timeliness, since seriously delayed state changes, such as commands or updates of routing tables, may negatively impact system operation. A security assessment can, therefore, begin with a focus on the assets [RFC4949] that may be the target of the state changes and the


access points in terms of interfaces and protocol exchanges through which such changes may occur. In the case of routing security, the focus is directed towards the elements associated with the establishment and maintenance of network connectivity.


This section sets the stage for the development of the analysis by applying the systematic approach proposed in [Myagmar2005] to the routing security, while also drawing references from other reviews and assessments found in the literature, particularly [RFC4593] and [Karlof2003] (i.e., selective forwarding, wormhole, and sinkhole attacks). The subsequent subsections begin with a focus on the elements of a generic routing process that is used to establish routing assets and points of access to the routing functionality. Next, the security model based on [ISO.7498-2.1989] is briefly described. Then, consideration is given to issues specific to or amplified in LLNs. This section concludes with the formulation of a set of security objectives for RPL.


4.1. Routing Assets and Points of Access
4.1. 路由资产和访问点

An asset is an important system resource (including information, process, or physical resource); the access to and corruption or loss of an asset adversely affects the system. In the control-plane context, an asset is information about the network, processes used to manage and manipulate this data, and the physical devices on which this data is stored and manipulated. The corruption or loss of these assets may adversely impact the control plane of the network. Within the same context, a point of access is an interface or protocol that facilitates interaction between control-plane assets. Identifying these assets and points of access will provide a basis for enumerating the attack surface of the control plane.


A level-0 data flow diagram [Yourdon1979] is used here to identify the assets and points of access within a generic routing process. The use of a data flow diagram allows for a clear and concise model of the way in which routing nodes interact and process information; hence, it provides a context for threats and attacks. The goal of the model is to be as detailed as possible so that corresponding assets, points of access, and processes in an individual routing protocol can be readily identified.


Figure 1 shows that nodes participating in the routing process transmit messages to discover neighbors and to exchange routing information; routes are then generated and stored, which may be maintained in the form of the protocol forwarding table. The nodes use the derived routes for making forwarding decisions.


                    :                                                 :
                    :                                                 :
        |Node_i|<------->(Routing Neighbor       _________________    :
                    :     Discovery)------------>Neighbor Topology    :
                    :                            -------+---------    :
                    :                                   |             :
        |Node_j|<------->(Route/Topology       +--------+             :
                    :     Exchange)            |                      :
                    :           |              V            ______    :
                    :           +---->(Route Generation)--->Routes    :
                    :                                       ---+--    :
                    :                                          |      :
                    : Routing on Node_k                        |      :
        |Forwarding                                            |
        |on Node_l|<-------------------------------------------+
                    :                                                 :
                    :                                                 :
        |Node_i|<------->(Routing Neighbor       _________________    :
                    :     Discovery)------------>Neighbor Topology    :
                    :                            -------+---------    :
                    :                                   |             :
        |Node_j|<------->(Route/Topology       +--------+             :
                    :     Exchange)            |                      :
                    :           |              V            ______    :
                    :           +---->(Route Generation)--->Routes    :
                    :                                       ---+--    :
                    :                                          |      :
                    : Routing on Node_k                        |      :
        |Forwarding                                            |
        |on Node_l|<-------------------------------------------+



(Proc) A process Proc


   topology   A structure storing neighbor adjacency (parent/child)
    routes    A structure storing the forwarding information base (FIB)
   topology   A structure storing neighbor adjacency (parent/child)
    routes    A structure storing the forwarding information base (FIB)

|Node_n| An external entity Node_n


   ------->   Data flow
   ------->   Data flow

Figure 1: Data Flow Diagram of a Generic Routing Process


Figure 1 shows the following:


o Assets include

o 资产包括

* routing and/or topology information;

* 路由和/或拓扑信息;

* route generation process;

* 路由生成过程;

* communication channel resources (bandwidth);

* 通信信道资源(带宽);

* node resources (computing capacity, memory, and remaining energy); and

* 节点资源(计算能力、内存和剩余能量);和

* node identifiers (including node identity and ascribed attributes such as relative or absolute node location).

* 节点标识符(包括节点标识和属性,如相对或绝对节点位置)。

o Points of access include

o 访问点包括

* neighbor discovery;

* 邻居发现;

* route/topology exchange; and

* 路由/拓扑交换;和

* node physical interfaces (including access to data storage).

* 节点物理接口(包括对数据存储的访问)。

A focus on the above list of assets and points of access enables a more directed assessment of routing security; for example, it is readily understood that some routing attacks are in the form of attempts to misrepresent routing topology. Indeed, the intention of the security threat analysis is to be comprehensive. Hence, some of the discussion that follows is associated with assets and points of access that are not directly related to routing protocol design but are nonetheless provided for reference since they do have direct consequences on the security of routing.


4.2. The ISO 7498-2 Security Reference Model
4.2. ISO 7498-2安全参考模型

At the conceptual level, security within an information system, in general, and applied to RPL in particular is concerned with the primary issues of authentication, access control, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation. In the context of RPL:


Authentication Authentication involves the mutual authentication of the routing peers prior to exchanging route information (i.e., peer authentication) as well as ensuring that the source of the route data is from the peer (i.e., data origin authentication). LLNs can be drained by unauthenticated peers before configuration per [RFC5548]. Availability of open and untrusted side channels for new joiners is required by [RFC5673], and strong and automated authentication is required so that networks can automatically accept or reject new joiners.


Access Control Access Control provides protection against unauthorized use of the asset and deals with the authorization of a node.


Confidentiality Confidentiality involves the protection of routing information as well as routing neighbor maintenance exchanges so that only authorized and intended network entities may view or access it. Because LLNs are most commonly found on a publicly accessible shared medium, e.g., air or wiring in a building, and are sometimes formed ad hoc, confidentiality also extends to the neighbor state and database information within the routing device since the deployment of the network creates the potential for unauthorized access to the physical devices themselves.


Integrity Integrity entails the protection of routing information and routing neighbor maintenance exchanges, as well as derived information maintained in the database, from unauthorized modifications, insertions, deletions, or replays to be addressed beyond the routing protocol.


Non-repudiation Non-repudiation is the assurance that the transmission and/or reception of a message cannot later be denied. The service of non-repudiation applies after the fact; thus, it relies on the logging or other capture of ongoing message exchanges and signatures. Routing protocols typically do not have a notion of repudiation, so non-repudiation services are not required. Further, with the LLN application domains as described in [RFC5867] and [RFC5548], proactive measures are much more critical than retrospective protections. Finally, given the significant practical limits to ongoing routing transaction logging and storage and individual device digital signature verification for each exchange, non-repudiation in the context of routing is an unsupportable burden that bears no further consideration as an RPL security issue.


It is recognized that, besides those security issues captured in the ISO 7498-2 model, availability is a security requirement:

人们认识到,除了ISO 7498-2模型中捕获的安全问题外,可用性是一项安全要求:

Availability Availability ensures that routing information exchanges and forwarding services are available when they are required for the functioning of the serving network. Availability will apply to maintaining efficient and correct operation of routing and neighbor discovery exchanges (including needed information) and forwarding services so as not to impair or limit the network's central traffic flow function.


It should be emphasized here that for RPL security, the above requirements must be complemented by the proper security policies and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that security objectives are met by a given RPL implementation.


4.3. Issues Specific to or Amplified in LLNs
4.3. 特定于LLN或在LLN中放大的问题

The requirements work detailed in Urban Requirements [RFC5548], Industrial Requirements [RFC5673], Home Automation [RFC5826], and Building Automation [RFC5867] have identified specific issues and constraints of routing in LLNs. The following is a list of observations from those requirements and evaluations of their impact on routing security considerations.


Limited energy, memory, and processing node resources As a consequence of these constraints, the need to evaluate the kinds of security that can be provided needs careful study. For instance, security provided at one level could be very memory efficient yet might also be very energy costly for the network (as a whole) if it requires significant effort to synchronize the security state. Synchronization of security states with sleepy nodes [RFC7102] is a complex issue. A non-rechargeable battery-powered node may well be limited in energy for it's lifetime: once exhausted, it may well never function again.


Large scale of rolled out network The possibly numerous nodes to be deployed make manual on-site configuration unlikely. For example, an urban deployment can see several hundreds of thousands of nodes being installed by many installers with a low level of expertise. Nodes may be installed and not activated for many years, and additional nodes may be added later on, which may be from old inventory. The lifetime of the network is measured in decades, and this complicates the operation of key management.


Autonomous operations Self-forming and self-organizing are commonly prescribed requirements of LLNs. In other words, a routing protocol designed for LLNs needs to contain elements of ad hoc networking and, in most cases, cannot rely on manual configuration for initialization or local filtering rules. Network topology/ownership changes, partitioning or merging, and node replacement can all contribute to complicating the operations of key management.


Highly directional traffic Some types of LLNs see a high percentage of their total traffic traverse between the nodes and the LLN Border Routers (LBRs) where the LLNs connect to non-LLNs. The special routing status of and the greater volume of traffic near the LBRs have routing security consequences as a higher-valued attack target. In fact, when Point-to-MultiPoint (P2MP) and MultiPoint-to-Point (MP2P) traffic represents a majority of the traffic, routing attacks consisting of advertising incorrect preferred routes can cause serious damage.


While it might seem that nodes higher up in the acyclic graph (i.e., those with lower rank) should be secured in a stronger fashion, it is not, in general, easy to predict which nodes will occupy those positions until after deployment. Issues of redundancy and inventory control suggest that any node might wind up in such a sensitive attack position, so all nodes are to be capable of being fully secured.


In addition, even if it were possible to predict which nodes will occupy positions of lower rank and provision them with stronger security mechanisms, in the absence of a strong authorization model, any node could advertise an incorrect preferred route.


Unattended locations and limited physical security In many applications, the nodes are deployed in unattended or remote locations; furthermore, the nodes themselves are often built with minimal physical protection. These constraints lower the barrier of accessing the data or security material stored on the nodes through physical means.


Support for mobility On the one hand, only a limited number of applications require the support of mobile nodes, e.g., a home LLN that includes nodes on wearable health care devices or an industry LLN that includes nodes on cranes and vehicles. On the other hand, if a routing protocol is indeed used in such applications, it will clearly need to have corresponding security mechanisms.


Additionally, nodes may appear to move from one side of a wall to another without any actual motion involved, which is the result of changes to electromagnetic properties, such as the opening and closing of a metal door.


Support for multicast and anycast Support for multicast and anycast is called out chiefly for large-scale networks. Since application of these routing mechanisms in autonomous operations of many nodes is new, the consequence on security requires careful consideration.


The above list considers how an LLN's physical constraints, size, operations, and variety of application areas may impact security. However, it is the combinations of these factors that particularly stress the security concerns. For instance, securing routing for a large number of autonomous devices that are left in unattended locations with limited physical security presents challenges that are not found in the common circumstance of administered networked routers. The following subsection sets up the security objectives for the routing protocol designed by the ROLL WG.

上面的列表考虑了LLN的物理约束、大小、操作和应用程序区域的多样性如何影响安全性。然而,正是这些因素的组合特别强调了安全问题。例如,为大量留在无人值守位置且物理安全性有限的自主设备提供安全路由带来了在受管网络路由器的常见情况下无法发现的挑战。以下小节为ROLL WG设计的路由协议设定了安全目标。

4.4. RPL Security Objectives
4.4. RPL安全目标

This subsection applies the ISO 7498-2 model to routing assets and access points, taking into account the LLN issues, to develop a set of RPL security objectives.

本小节将ISO 7498-2模型应用于路由资产和接入点,同时考虑LLN问题,以制定一套RPL安全目标。

Since the fundamental function of a routing protocol is to build routes for forwarding packets, it is essential to ensure that:


o routing/topology information integrity remains intact during transfer and in storage;

o 路由/拓扑信息完整性在传输和存储期间保持不变;

o routing/topology information is used by authorized entities; and

o 授权实体使用路由/拓扑信息;和

o routing/topology information is available when needed.

o 路由/拓扑信息在需要时可用。

In conjunction, it is necessary to be assured that:


o Authorized peers authenticate themselves during the routing neighbor discovery process.

o 授权对等方在路由邻居发现过程中对自己进行身份验证。

o The routing/topology information received is generated according to the protocol design.

o 接收到的路由/拓扑信息根据协议设计生成。

However, when trust cannot be fully vested through authentication of the principals alone, i.e., concerns of an insider attack, assurance of the truthfulness and timeliness of the received routing/topology information is necessary. With regard to confidentiality, protecting the routing/topology information from unauthorized exposure may be desirable in certain cases but is in itself less pertinent, in general, to the routing function.


One of the main problems of synchronizing security states of sleepy nodes, as listed in the last subsection, lies in difficulties in authentication; these nodes may not have received the most recent update of security material in time. Similarly, the issues of minimal manual configuration, prolonged rollout and delayed addition of nodes, and network topology changes also complicate key management. Hence, routing in LLNs needs to bootstrap the authentication process and allow for a flexible expiration scheme of authentication credentials.


The vulnerability brought forth by some special-function nodes, e.g., LBRs, requires the assurance, particularly in a security context, of the following:


o The availability of communication channels and node resources.

o 通信通道和节点资源的可用性。

o The neighbor discovery process operates without undermining routing availability.

o 邻居发现过程在不影响路由可用性的情况下运行。

There are other factors that are not part of RPL but directly affect its function. These factors include a weaker barrier of accessing the data or security material stored on the nodes through physical means; therefore, the internal and external interfaces of a node need to be adequate for guarding the integrity, and possibly the confidentiality, of stored information, as well as the integrity of routing and route generation processes.


Each individual system's use and environment will dictate how the above objectives are applied, including the choices of security services as well as the strengths of the mechanisms that must be implemented. The next two sections take a closer look at how the RPL security objectives may be compromised and how those potential compromises can be countered.


5. Threat Sources
5. 威胁源

[RFC4593] provides a detailed review of the threat sources: outsiders and Byzantine. RPL has the same threat sources.


6. Threats and Attacks
6. 威胁和攻击

This section outlines general categories of threats under the ISO 7498-2 model and highlights the specific attacks in each of these categories for RPL. As defined in [RFC4949], a threat is "a potential for violation of security, which exists when there is a circumstance, capability, action, or event that could breach security and cause harm."

本节概述了ISO 7498-2模型下的威胁的一般类别,并重点介绍了RPL在这些类别中的具体攻击。正如[RFC4949]中所定义的,威胁是“当存在可能破坏安全并造成伤害的情况、能力、行动或事件时,存在违反安全的可能性。”

Per [RFC3067], an attack is "an assault on system security that derives from an intelligent threat, i.e., an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security services and violate the security policy of a system."


The subsequent subsections consider the threats and the attacks that can cause security breaches under the ISO 7498-2 model to the routing assets and via the routing points of access identified in Section 4.1. The assessment reviews the security concerns of each routing asset and looks at the attacks that can exploit routing points of access. The threats and attacks identified are based on the routing model analysis and associated review of the existing literature. The source of the attacks is assumed to be from either inside or outside attackers. While some attackers inside the network will be using compromised nodes and, therefore, are only able to do what an ordinary node can ("node-equivalent"), other attacks may not be limited in memory, CPU, power consumption, or long-term storage. Moore's law favors the attacker with access to the latest capabilities, while the defenders will remain in place for years to decades.

随后的小节考虑了在ISO 798-2模型下对路由资产造成安全破坏的威胁和攻击,以及通过在第4.1节中标识的访问路由点。评估将审查每个路由资产的安全问题,并查看可能利用路由访问点的攻击。确定的威胁和攻击基于路由模型分析和现有文献的相关回顾。假设攻击源来自内部或外部攻击者。虽然网络中的一些攻击者将使用受损节点,因此只能执行普通节点可以执行的操作(“节点等效”),但其他攻击可能不限于内存、CPU、功耗或长期存储。摩尔定律有利于攻击者获得最新的能力,而防御者将在几年到几十年内保持在位。

6.1. Threats Due to Failures to Authenticate
6.1. 由于身份验证失败而造成的威胁
6.1.1. Node Impersonation
6.1.1. 节点模拟

If an attacker can join a network using any identity, then it may be able to assume the role of a legitimate (and existing node). It may be able to report false readings (in metering applications) or provide inappropriate control messages (in control systems involving actuators) if the security of the application is implied by the security of the routing system.


Even in systems where there is application-layer security, the ability to impersonate a node would permit an attacker to direct traffic to itself. This may permit various on-path attacks that would otherwise be difficult, such as replaying, delaying, or duplicating (application) control messages.


6.1.2. Dummy Node
6.1.2. 虚拟节点

If an attacker can join a network using any identify, then it can pretend to be a legitimate node, receiving any service legitimate nodes receive. It may also be able to report false readings (in metering applications), provide inappropriate authorizations (in control systems involving actuators), or perform any other attacks that are facilitated by being able to direct traffic towards itself.


6.1.3. Node Resource Spam
6.1.3. 节点资源垃圾邮件

If an attacker can join a network with any identity, then it can continuously do so with new (random) identities. This act may drain down the resources of the network (battery, RAM, bandwidth). This may cause legitimate nodes of the network to be unable to communicate.


6.2. Threats Due to Failure to Keep Routing Information Confidential
6.2. 由于未能对路由信息保密而造成的威胁

The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that there are attacks against the confidentiality of routing information at all points of access. This threat may result in disclosure, as described in Section 3.1.2 of [RFC4593], and may involve a disclosure of routing information.


6.2.1. Routing Exchange Exposure
6.2.1. 路由交换风险

Routing exchanges include both routing information as well as information associated with the establishment and maintenance of neighbor state information. As indicated in Section 4.1, the associated routing information assets may also include device-specific resource information, such as available memory, remaining power, etc., that may be metrics of the routing protocol.


The routing exchanges will contain reachability information, which would identify the relative importance of different nodes in the network. Nodes higher up in the DODAG, to which more streams of information flow, would be more interesting targets for other attacks, and routing exchange exposures could identify them.


6.2.2. Routing Information (Routes and Network Topology) Exposure
6.2.2. 路由信息(路由和网络拓扑)公开

Routes (which may be maintained in the form of the protocol forwarding table) and neighbor topology information are the products of the routing process that are stored within the node device databases.


The exposure of this information will allow attackers to gain direct access to the configuration and connectivity of the network, thereby exposing routing to targeted attacks on key nodes or links. Since routes and neighbor topology information are stored within the node device, attacks on the confidentiality of the information will apply to the physical device, including specified and unspecified internal and external interfaces.


The forms of attack that allow unauthorized access or disclosure of the routing information will include:


o Physical device compromise.

o 物理设备泄露。

o Remote device access attacks (including those occurring through remote network management or software/field upgrade interfaces).

o 远程设备访问攻击(包括通过远程网络管理或软件/现场升级接口发生的攻击)。

Both of these attack vectors are considered a device-specific issue and are out of scope for RPL to defend against. In some applications, physical device compromise may be a real threat, and it may be necessary to provide for other devices to securely detect a compromised device and react quickly to exclude it.


6.3. Threats and Attacks on Integrity
6.3. 对诚信的威胁和攻击

The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that information and identity assets are exposed to integrity threats from all points of access. In other words, the integrity threat space is defined by the potential for exploitation introduced by access to assets available through routing exchanges and the on-device storage.


6.3.1. Routing Information Manipulation
6.3.1. 路由信息操纵

Manipulation of routing information that ranges from neighbor states to derived routes will allow unauthorized sources to influence the operation and convergence of the routing protocols and ultimately impact the forwarding decisions made in the network.


Manipulation of topology and reachability information will allow unauthorized sources to influence the nodes with which routing information is exchanged and updated. The consequence of manipulating routing exchanges can thus lead to suboptimality and fragmentation or partitioning of the network by restricting the universe of routers with which associations can be established and maintained.


A suboptimal network may use too much power and/or may congest some routes leading to premature failure of a node and a denial of service (DoS) on the entire network.


In addition, being able to attract network traffic can make a black-hole attack more damaging.


The forms of attack that allow manipulation to compromise the content and validity of routing information include:


o falsification, including overclaiming and misclaiming (claiming routes to devices that the device cannot in fact reach);

o 伪造,包括多报和误报(声称设备实际上无法到达的设备路线);

o routing information replay;

o 路由信息回放;

o Byzantine (internal) attacks that permit corruption of routing information in the node even when the node continues to be a validated entity within the network (see, for example, [RFC4593] for further discussions on Byzantine attacks); and

o 拜占庭式(内部)攻击,允许节点中的路由信息损坏,即使该节点仍然是网络中的有效实体(例如,有关拜占庭式攻击的进一步讨论,请参见[RFC4593]);和

o physical device compromise or remote device access attacks.

o 物理设备泄露或远程设备访问攻击。

6.3.2. Node Identity Misappropriation
6.3.2. 节点身份盗用

Falsification or misappropriation of node identity between routing participants opens the door for other attacks; it can also cause incorrect routing relationships to form and/or topologies to emerge. Routing attacks may also be mounted through less-sophisticated node identity misappropriation in which the valid information broadcasted or exchanged by a node is replayed without modification. The receipt of seemingly valid information that is, however, no longer current can result in routing disruption and instability (including failure to converge). Without measures to authenticate the routing participants and to ensure the freshness and validity of the received information, the protocol operation can be compromised. The forms of attack that misuse node identity include:


o Identity attacks, including Sybil attacks (see [Sybil2002]) in which a malicious node illegitimately assumes multiple identities.

o 身份攻击,包括Sybil攻击(参见[Sybil2002]),其中恶意节点非法使用多个身份。

o Routing information replay.

o 路由信息重播。

6.4. Threats and Attacks on Availability
6.4. 对可用性的威胁和攻击

The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that the process and resource assets are exposed to threats against availability; attacks in this category may exploit directly or indirectly information exchange or forwarding (see [RFC4732] for a general discussion).


6.4.1. Routing Exchange Interference or Disruption
6.4.1. 路由交换干扰或中断

Interference is the threat action and disruption is the threat consequence that allows attackers to influence the operation and convergence of the routing protocols by impeding the routing information exchange.


The forms of attack that allow interference or disruption of routing exchange include:


o routing information replay;

o 路由信息回放;

o ACK spoofing; and

o ACK欺骗;和

o overload attacks (Section 7.3.2).

o 过载攻击(第7.3.2节)。

In addition, attacks may also be directly conducted at the physical layer in the form of jamming or interfering.


6.4.2. Network Traffic Forwarding Disruption
6.4.2. 网络流量转发中断

The disruption of the network traffic forwarding capability will undermine the central function of network routers and the ability to handle user traffic. This affects the availability of the network because of the potential to impair the primary capability of the network.


In addition to physical-layer obstructions, the forms of attack that allow disruption of network traffic forwarding include [Karlof2003]:


o selective forwarding attacks;

o 选择性转发攻击;


Figure 2: Selective Forwarding Example


o wormhole attacks; and

o 虫洞攻击;和

                  |                                         ^
                  |               Private Link              |
                  |                                         ^
                  |               Private Link              |

Figure 3: Wormhole Attacks


o sinkhole attacks.

o 天坑攻击。

                |Node_1|     |Node_4|
                    |            |
                    `--------.   |
                Falsify as    \  |
                Good Link \   |  |
                to Node_5  \  |  |
                            \ V  V
                |Node_2|-->|Attacker|--Not Forwarded---x|Node_5|
                              ^  ^ \
                              |  |  \ Falsify as
                              |  |   \Good Link
                              /  |    to Node_5
                     ,-------'   |
                     |           |
                |Node_3|     |Node_i|
                |Node_1|     |Node_4|
                    |            |
                    `--------.   |
                Falsify as    \  |
                Good Link \   |  |
                to Node_5  \  |  |
                            \ V  V
                |Node_2|-->|Attacker|--Not Forwarded---x|Node_5|
                              ^  ^ \
                              |  |  \ Falsify as
                              |  |   \Good Link
                              /  |    to Node_5
                     ,-------'   |
                     |           |
                |Node_3|     |Node_i|

Figure 4: Sinkhole Attack Example


These attacks are generally done to both control- and forwarding-plane traffic. A system that prevents control-plane traffic (RPL messages) from being diverted in these ways will also prevent actual data from being diverted.


6.4.3. Communications Resource Disruption
6.4.3. 通信资源中断

Attacks mounted against the communication channel resource assets needed by the routing protocol can be used as a means of disrupting its operation. However, while various forms of DoS attacks on the underlying transport subsystem will affect routing protocol exchanges and operation (for example, physical-layer Radio Frequency (RF) jamming in a wireless network or link-layer attacks), these attacks cannot be countered by the routing protocol. As such, the threats to the underlying transport network that supports routing is considered beyond the scope of the current document. Nonetheless, attacks on the subsystem will affect routing operation and must be directly addressed within the underlying subsystem and its implemented protocol layers.


6.4.4. Node Resource Exhaustion
6.4.4. 节点资源耗尽

A potential threat consequence can arise from attempts to overload the node resource asset by initiating exchanges that can lead to the exhaustion of processing, memory, or energy resources. The establishment and maintenance of routing neighbors opens the routing process to engagement and potential acceptance of multiple neighboring peers. Association information must be stored for each peer entity and for the wireless network operation provisions made to periodically update and reassess the associations. An introduced proliferation of apparent routing peers can, therefore, have a negative impact on node resources.


Node resources may also be unduly consumed by attackers attempting uncontrolled topology peering or routing exchanges, routing replays, or the generating of other data-traffic floods. Beyond the disruption of communications channel resources, these consequences may be able to exhaust node resources only where the engagements are able to proceed with the peer routing entities. Routing operation and network forwarding functions can thus be adversely impacted by node resources exhaustion that stems from attacks that include:


o identity (including Sybil) attacks (see [Sybil2002]);

o 身份(包括Sybil)攻击(见[Sybil2002]);

o routing information replay attacks;

o 路由信息重放攻击;

o HELLO-type flood attacks; and

o HELLO型洪水袭击;和

o overload attacks (Section 7.3.2).

o 过载攻击(第7.3.2节)。

7. Countermeasures
7. 对策

By recognizing the characteristics of LLNs that may impact routing, this analysis provides the basis for understanding the capabilities within RPL used to deter the identified attacks and mitigate the threats. The following subsections consider such countermeasures by grouping the attacks according to the classification of the ISO 7498-2 model so that associations with the necessary security services are more readily visible.


7.1. Confidentiality Attack Countermeasures
7.1. 保密攻击对策

Attacks to disclosure routing information may be mounted at the level of the routing information assets, at the points of access associated with routing exchanges between nodes, or through device interface access. To gain access to routing/topology information, the attacker may rely on a compromised node that deliberately exposes the information during the routing exchange process, on passive wiretapping or traffic analysis, or on attempting access through a component or device interface of a tampered routing node.


7.1.1. Countering Deliberate Exposure Attacks
7.1.1. 应对蓄意曝光攻击

A deliberate exposure attack is one in which an entity that is party to the routing process or topology exchange allows the routing/ topology information or generated route information to be exposed to an unauthorized entity.


For instance, due to misconfiguration or inappropriate enabling of a diagnostic interface, an entity might be copying ("bridging") traffic from a secured ESSID/PAN to an unsecured interface.


A prerequisite to countering this attack is to ensure that the communicating nodes are authenticated prior to data encryption applied in the routing exchange. The authentication ensures that the LLN starts with trusted nodes, but it does not provide an indication of whether the node has been compromised.


Reputation systems could be used to help when some nodes may sleep for extended periods of time. It is also unclear if resulting datasets would even fit into constrained devices.


To mitigate the risk of deliberate exposure, the process that communicating nodes use to establish session keys must be peer-to-peer (i.e., between the routing initiating and responding nodes). As is pointed out in [RFC4107], automatic key management is critical for good security. This helps ensure that neither node is exchanging routing information with another peer without the


knowledge of both communicating peers. For a deliberate exposure attack to succeed, the comprised node will need to be more overt and take independent actions in order to disclose the routing information to a third party.


Note that the same measures that apply to securing routing/topology exchanges between operational nodes must also extend to field tools and other devices used in a deployed network where such devices can be configured to participate in routing exchanges.


7.1.2. Countering Passive Wiretapping Attacks
7.1.2. 对抗被动窃听攻击

A passive wiretap attack seeks to breach routing confidentiality through passive, direct analysis and processing of the information exchanges between nodes.


Passive wiretap attacks can be directly countered through the use of data encryption for all routing exchanges. Only when a validated and authenticated node association is completed will routing exchange be allowed to proceed using established session keys and an agreed encryption algorithm. The mandatory-to-implement CCM mode AES-128 method, described in [RFC3610], is believed to be secure against a brute-force attack by even the most well-equipped adversary.


The significant challenge for RPL is in the provisioning of the key, which in some modes of RFC 6550 is used network wide. This problem is not solved in RFC 6550, and it is the subject of significant future work: see, for instance, [AceCharterProposal], [SolaceProposal], and [SmartObjectSecurityWorkshop].

RPL面临的重大挑战是密钥的提供,在RFC 6550的某些模式中,密钥在网络范围内使用。这个问题在RFC 6550中没有得到解决,它是未来重要工作的主题:例如,请参见[AceCharterProposal]、[SolaceProposal]和[SmartObjectSecurityWorkshop]。

A number of deployments, such as [ZigBeeIP] specify no Layer 3 (L3) / RPL encryption or authentication and rely upon similar security at Layer 2 (L2). These networks are immune to outside wiretapping attacks but are vulnerable to passive (and active) routing attacks through compromises of nodes (see Section 8.2).


Section 10.9 of [RFC6550] specifies AES-128 in CCM mode with a 32-bit Message Authentication Code (MAC).


Section 5.6 of ZigBee IP [ZigBeeIP] specifies use of CCM, with PANA and EAP-TLS for key management.

ZigBee IP[ZigBeeIP]第5.6节规定了CCM的使用,PANA和EAP-TLS用于密钥管理。

7.1.3. Countering Traffic Analysis
7.1.3. 反流量分析

Traffic analysis provides an indirect means of subverting confidentiality and gaining access to routing information by allowing an attacker to indirectly map the connectivity or flow patterns (including link load) of the network from which other attacks can be


mounted. The traffic-analysis attack on an LLN, especially one founded on a shared medium, is passive and relies on the ability to read the immutable source/destination L2 and/or L3 routing information that must remain unencrypted to permit network routing.


One way in which passive traffic-analysis attacks can be muted is through the support of load balancing that allows traffic to a given destination to be sent along diverse routing paths. RPL does not generally support multipath routing within a single DODAG. Multiple DODAGs are supported in the protocol, and an implementation could make use of that. RPL does not have any inherent or standard way to guarantee that the different DODAGs would have significantly diverse paths. Having the diverse DODAGs routed at different border routers might work in some instances, and this could be combined with a multipath technology like Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [RFC6824]. It is unlikely that it will be affordable in many LLNs, as few deployments will have memory space for more than a few sets of DODAG tables.


Another approach to countering passive traffic analysis could be for nodes to maintain a constant amount of traffic to different destinations through the generation of arbitrary traffic flows; the drawback of course would be the consequent overhead and energy expenditure.


The only means of fully countering a traffic-analysis attack is through the use of tunneling (encapsulation) where encryption is applied across the entirety of the original packet source/destination addresses. Deployments that use L2 security that includes encryption already do this for all traffic.


7.1.4. Countering Remote Device Access Attacks
7.1.4. 对抗远程设备访问攻击

Where LLN nodes are deployed in the field, measures are introduced to allow for remote retrieval of routing data and for software or field upgrades. These paths create the potential for a device to be remotely accessed across the network or through a provided field tool. In the case of network management, a node can be directly requested to provide routing tables and neighbor information.


To ensure confidentiality of the node routing information against attacks through remote access, any local or remote device requesting routing information must be authenticated and must be authorized for that access. Since remote access is not invoked as part of a routing protocol, security of routing information stored on the node against remote access will not be addressable as part of the routing protocol.


7.2. Integrity Attack Countermeasures
7.2. 完整性攻击对策

Integrity attack countermeasures address routing information manipulation, as well as node identity and routing information misuse. Manipulation can occur in the form of a falsification attack and physical compromise. To be effective, the following development considers the two aspects of falsification, namely, the unauthorized modifications and the overclaiming and misclaiming content. The countering of physical compromise was considered in the previous section and is not repeated here. With regard to misuse, there are two types of attacks to be deterred: identity attacks and replay attacks.


7.2.1. Countering Unauthorized Modification Attacks
7.2.1. 对抗未经授权的修改攻击

Unauthorized modifications may occur in the form of altering the message being transferred or the data stored. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that only authorized nodes can change the portion of the information that is allowed to be mutable, while the integrity of the rest of the information is protected, e.g., through well-studied cryptographic mechanisms.


Unauthorized modifications may also occur in the form of insertion or deletion of messages during protocol changes. Therefore, the protocol needs to ensure the integrity of the sequence of the exchange sequence.


The countermeasure to unauthorized modifications needs to:


o implement access control on storage;

o 对存储设备实施访问控制;

o provide data integrity service to transferred messages and stored data; and

o 为传输的消息和存储的数据提供数据完整性服务;和

o include a sequence number under integrity protection.

o 包括完整性保护下的序列号。

7.2.2. Countering Overclaiming and Misclaiming Attacks
7.2.2. 打击滥发和误发攻击

Both overclaiming and misclaiming aim to introduce false routes or a false topology that would not occur otherwise, while there are not necessarily unauthorized modifications to the routing messages or information. In order to counter overclaiming, the capability to determine unreasonable routes or topology is required.


The counter to overclaiming and misclaiming may employ:


o Comparison with historical routing/topology data.

o 与历史路由/拓扑数据进行比较。

o Designs that restrict realizable network topologies.

o 限制可实现网络拓扑的设计。

RPL includes no specific mechanisms in the protocol to counter overclaims or misclaims. An implementation could have specific heuristics implemented locally.


7.2.3. Countering Identity (including Sybil) Attacks
7.2.3. 对抗身份(包括Sybil)攻击

Identity attacks, sometimes simply called spoofing, seek to gain or damage assets whose access is controlled through identity. In routing, an identity attacker can illegitimately participate in routing exchanges, distribute false routing information, or cause an invalid outcome of a routing process.


A perpetrator of Sybil attacks assumes multiple identities. The result is not only an amplification of the damage to routing but extension to new areas, e.g., where geographic distribution is explicitly or implicitly an asset to an application running on the LLN, for example, the LBR in a P2MP or MP2P LLN.

Sybil攻击的实施者具有多重身份。其结果不仅扩大了对路由的破坏,而且扩展到了新的领域,例如,地理分布明确或隐含地成为在LLN上运行的应用程序的资产,例如,P2MP或MP2P LLN中的LBR。

RPL includes specific public key-based authentication at L3 that provides for authorization. Many deployments use L2 security that includes admission controls at L2 using mechanisms such as PANA.


7.2.4. Countering Routing Information Replay Attacks
7.2.4. 对抗路由信息重放攻击

In many routing protocols, message replay can result in false topology and/or routes. This is often counted with some kind of counter to ensure the freshness of the message. Replay of a current, literal RPL message is, in general, idempotent to the topology. If replayed, an older (lower DODAGVersionNumber) message would be rejected as being stale. If the trickle algorithm further dampens the effect of any such replay, as if the message was current, then it would contain the same information as before, and it would cause no network changes.


Replays may well occur in some radio technologies (though not very likely; see [IEEE.802.15.4]) as a result of echos or reflections, so some replays must be assumed to occur naturally.


Note that for there to be no effect at all, the replay must be done with the same apparent power for all nodes receiving the replay. A change in apparent power might change the metrics through changes to the Expected Transmission Count (ETX); therefore, it might affect the routing even though the contents of the packet were never changed. Any replay that appears to be different should be analyzed as a selective forwarding attack, sinkhole attack, or wormhole attack.


7.2.5. Countering Byzantine Routing Information Attacks
7.2.5. 抵御拜占庭式路由信息攻击

Where a node is captured or compromised but continues to operate for a period with valid network security credentials, the potential exists for routing information to be manipulated. This compromise of the routing information could thus exist in spite of security countermeasures that operate between the peer routing devices.


Consistent with the end-to-end principle of communications, such an attack can only be fully addressed through measures operating directly between the routing entities themselves or by means of external entities accessing and independently analyzing the routing information. Verification of the authenticity and liveliness of the routing entities can, therefore, only provide a limited counter against internal (Byzantine) node attacks.


For link-state routing protocols where information is flooded with, for example, areas (OSPF [RFC2328]) or levels (IS-IS [RFC7142]), countermeasures can be directly applied by the routing entities through the processing and comparison of link-state information received from different peers. By comparing the link information from multiple sources, decisions can be made by a routing node or external entity with regard to routing information validity; see Chapter 2 of [Perlman1988] for a discussion on flooding attacks.

对于信息充斥例如区域(OSPF[RFC2328])或级别(is-is[RFC7142])的链路状态路由协议,路由实体可以通过处理和比较从不同对等方接收的链路状态信息直接应用对策。通过比较来自多个来源的链路信息,路由节点或外部实体可以做出关于路由信息有效性的决策;有关洪水袭击的讨论,请参见[Perlman 1988]第2章。

For distance vector protocols, such as RPL, where information is aggregated at each routing node, it is not possible for nodes to directly detect Byzantine information manipulation attacks from the routing information exchange. In such cases, the routing protocol must include and support indirect communications exchanges between non-adjacent routing peers to provide a secondary channel for performing routing information validation. S-RIP [Wan2004] is an example of the implementation of this type of dedicated routing protocol security where the correctness of aggregate distance vector information can only be validated by initiating confirmation exchanges directly between nodes that are not routing neighbors.


RPL does not provide any direct mechanisms like S-RIP. It does listen to multiple parents and may switch parents if it begins to suspect that it is being lied to.


7.3. Availability Attack Countermeasures
7.3. 可用性攻击对策

As alluded to before, availability requires that routing information exchanges and forwarding mechanisms be available when needed so as to guarantee proper functioning of the network. This may, e.g., include the correct operation of routing information and neighbor state information exchanges, among others. We will highlight the key


features of the security threats along with typical countermeasures to prevent or at least mitigate them. We will also note that an availability attack may be facilitated by an identity attack as well as a replay attack, as was addressed in Sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4, respectively.


7.3.1. Countering HELLO Flood Attacks and ACK Spoofing Attacks
7.3.1. 对抗HELLO洪水攻击和ACK欺骗攻击

HELLO Flood [Karlof2003], [HELLO], and ACK spoofing attacks are different but highly related forms of attacking an LLN. They essentially lead nodes to believe that suitable routes are available even though they are not and hence constitute a serious availability attack.

HELLO Flood[Karlof2003]、[HELLO]和ACK欺骗攻击是攻击LLN的不同但高度相关的形式。它们基本上会使节点相信,即使没有合适的路由,也有合适的路由可用,因此构成严重的可用性攻击。

A HELLO attack mounted against RPL would involve sending out (or replaying) DODAG Information Object (DIO) messages by the attacker. Lower-power LLN nodes might then attempt to join the DODAG at a lower rank than they would otherwise.


The most effective method from [HELLO] is bidirectional verification. A number of L2 links are arranged in controller/spoke arrangements and are continuously validating connectivity at layer 2.


In addition, in order to calculate metrics, the ETX must be computed, and this involves, in general, sending a number of messages between nodes that are believed to be adjacent. One such protocol is [MESH-LINK].


In order to join the DODAG, a Destination Advertisement Object (DAO) message is sent upwards. In RPL, the DAO is acknowledged by the DAO-ACK message. This clearly checks bidirectionality at the control plane.


As discussed in Section 5.1 of [HELLO], a receiver with a sensitive receiver could well hear the DAOs and even send DAO-ACKs as well. Such a node is a form of wormhole attack.


These attacks are also all easily defended against using either L2 or L3 authentication. Such an attack could only be made against a completely open network (such as might be used for provisioning new nodes) or by a compromised node.


7.3.2. Countering Overload Attacks
7.3.2. 对抗过载攻击

Overload attacks are a form of DoS attack in that a malicious node overloads the network with irrelevant traffic, thereby draining the nodes' energy store more quickly when the nodes rely on batteries or energy scavenging. Thus, it significantly shortens the lifetime of


networks of energy-constrained nodes and constitutes another serious availability attack.


With energy being one of the most precious assets of LLNs, targeting its availability is a fairly obvious attack. Another way of depleting the energy of an LLN node is to have the malicious node overload the network with irrelevant traffic. This impacts availability since certain routes get congested, which:


o renders them useless for affected nodes; hence, data cannot be delivered;

o 使它们对受影响的节点无效;因此,无法交付数据;

o makes routes longer as the shortest path algorithms work with the congested network; and

o 当最短路径算法在拥挤的网络中工作时,使路由变长;和

o depletes battery and energy scavenging nodes more quickly and thus shortens the network's availability at large.

o 更快地耗尽电池和能量清除节点,从而大大缩短网络的可用性。

Overload attacks can be countered by deploying a series of mutually non-exclusive security measures that:


o introduce quotas on the traffic rate each node is allowed to send;

o 对每个节点允许发送的流量率引入配额;

o isolate nodes that send traffic above a certain threshold based on system operation characteristics; and

o 根据系统运行特点,隔离发送流量超过某个阈值的节点;和

o allow only trusted data to be received and forwarded.

o 只允许接收和转发受信任的数据。

As for the first one, a simple approach to minimize the harmful impact of an overload attack is to introduce traffic quotas. This prevents a malicious node from injecting a large amount of traffic into the network, even though it does not prevent the said node from injecting irrelevant traffic at all. Another method is to isolate nodes from the network at the network layer once it has been detected that more traffic is injected into the network than allowed by a prior set or dynamically adjusted threshold. Finally, if communication is sufficiently secured, only trusted nodes can receive and forward traffic, which also lowers the risk of an overload attack.


Receiving nodes that validate signatures and sending nodes that encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages. Where feasible, certificates should be validated prior to use of the associated keys to counter potential resource overloading attacks. The associated design decision needs to also consider that the validation process requires resources; thus, it could be exploited for attacks. Alternatively, resource management limits can be placed


on routing security processing events (see the comment in Section 6, paragraph 4, of [RFC5751]).


7.3.3. Countering Selective Forwarding Attacks
7.3.3. 对抗选择性转发攻击

Selective forwarding attacks are a form of DoS attack that impacts the availability of the generated routing paths.


A selective forwarding attack may be done by a node involved with the routing process, or it may be done by what otherwise appears to be a passive antenna or other RF feature or device, but is in fact an active (and selective) device. An RF antenna/repeater that is not selective is not a threat.


An insider malicious node basically blends in neatly with the network but then may decide to forward and/or manipulate certain packets. If all packets are dropped, then this attacker is also often referred to as a "black hole". Such a form of attack is particularly dangerous if coupled with sinkhole attacks since inherently a large amount of traffic is attracted to the malicious node, thereby causing significant damage. In a shared medium, an outside malicious node would selectively jam overheard data flows, where the thus caused collisions incur selective forwarding.


Selective forwarding attacks can be countered by deploying a series of mutually non-exclusive security measures:


o Multipath routing of the same message over disjoint paths.

o 不相交路径上相同消息的多路径路由。

o Dynamically selecting the next hop from a set of candidates.

o 从一组候选中动态选择下一跳。

The first measure basically guarantees that if a message gets lost on a particular routing path due to a malicious selective forwarding attack, there will be another route that successfully delivers the data. Such a method is inherently suboptimal from an energy consumption point of view; it is also suboptimal from a network utilization perspective. The second method basically involves a constantly changing routing topology in that next-hop routers are chosen from a dynamic set in the hope that the number of malicious nodes in this set is negligible. A routing protocol that allows for disjoint routing paths may also be useful.


7.3.4. Countering Sinkhole Attacks
7.3.4. 对抗天坑攻击

In sinkhole attacks, the malicious node manages to attract a lot of traffic mainly by advertising the availability of high-quality links even though there are none [Karlof2003]. Hence, it constitutes a serious attack on availability.


The malicious node creates a sinkhole by attracting a large amount of, if not all, traffic from surrounding neighbors by advertising in and outwards links of superior quality. Hence, affected nodes eagerly route their traffic via the malicious node that, if coupled with other attacks such as selective forwarding, may lead to serious availability and security breaches. Such an attack can only be executed by an inside malicious node and is generally very difficult to detect. An ongoing attack has a profound impact on the network topology and essentially becomes a problem of flow control.


Sinkhole attacks can be countered by deploying a series of mutually non-exclusive security measures to:


o use geographical insights for flow control;

o 使用地理信息进行流量控制;

o isolate nodes that receive traffic above a certain threshold;

o 隔离接收流量超过某个阈值的节点;

o dynamically pick up the next hop from a set of candidates; and

o 动态地从一组候选者中拾取下一跳;和

o allow only trusted data to be received and forwarded.

o 只允许接收和转发受信任的数据。

A canary node could periodically call home (using a cryptographic process) with the home system, noting if it fails to call in. This provides detection of a problem, but does not mitigate it, and it may have significant energy consequences for the LLN.


Some LLNs may provide for geolocation services, often derived from solving triangulation equations from radio delay calculation; such calculations could in theory be subverted by a sinkhole that transmitted at precisely the right power in a node-to-node fashion.


While geographic knowledge could help assure that traffic always goes in the physical direction desired, it would not assure that the traffic is taking the most efficient route, as the lowest cost real route might match the physical topology, such as when different parts of an LLN are connected by high-speed wired networks.


7.3.5. Countering Wormhole Attacks
7.3.5. 对抗虫洞攻击

In wormhole attacks, at least two malicious nodes claim to have a short path between themselves [Karlof2003]. This changes the availability of certain routing paths and hence constitutes a serious security breach.


Essentially, two malicious insider nodes use another, more powerful, transmitter to communicate with each other and thereby distort the would-be-agreed routing path. This distortion could involve shortcutting and hence paralyzing a large part of the network; it


could also involve tunneling the information to another region of the network where there are, e.g., more malicious nodes available to aid the intrusion or where messages are replayed, etc.


In conjunction with selective forwarding, wormhole attacks can create race conditions that impact topology maintenance and routing protocols as well as any security suits built on "time of check" and "time of use".


A pure wormhole attack is nearly impossible to detect. A wormhole that is used in order to subsequently mount another kind of attack would be defeated by defeating the other attack. A perfect wormhole, in which there is nothing adverse that occurs to the traffic, would be difficult to call an attack. The worst thing that a benign wormhole can do in such a situation is to cease to operate (become unstable), causing the network to have to recalculate routes.


A highly unstable wormhole is no different than a radio opaque (i.e., metal) door that opens and closes a lot. RPL includes hysteresis in its objective functions [RFC6719] in an attempt to deal with frequent changes to the ETX between nodes.


8. RPL Security Features
8. RPL安全特性

The assessments and analysis in Section 6 examined all areas of threats and attacks that could impact routing, and the countermeasures presented in Section 7 were reached without confining the consideration to means only available to routing. This section puts the results into perspective, dealing with those threats that are endemic to this field, that have been mitigated through RPL protocol design, and that require specific decisions to be made as part of provisioning a network.


The first part of this section, Sections 8.1 to 8.3, presents a description of RPL security features that address specific threats. The second part of this section, Section 8.4, discusses issues of the provisioning of security aspects that may impact routing but that also require considerations beyond the routing protocol, as well as potential approaches.


RPL employs multicast, so these alternative communications modes MUST be secured with the same routing security services specified in this section. Furthermore, irrespective of the modes of communication, nodes MUST provide adequate physical tamper resistance commensurate with the particular application-domain environment to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of stored routing information.


8.1. Confidentiality Features
8.1. 保密特征

With regard to confidentiality, protecting the routing/topology information from unauthorized disclosure is not directly essential to maintaining the routing function. Breaches of confidentiality may lead to other attacks or the focusing of an attacker's resources (see Section 6.2) but does not of itself directly undermine the operation of the routing function. However, to protect against and reduce consequences from other more direct attacks, routing information should be protected. Thus, to secure RPL:


o Implement payload encryption using L3 mechanisms described in [RFC6550] or

o 使用[RFC6550]中描述的L3机制实施有效负载加密;或

o Implement L2 confidentiality

o 实现二级机密性

Where confidentiality is incorporated into the routing exchanges, encryption algorithms and key lengths need to be specified in accordance with the level of protection dictated by the routing protocol and the associated application-domain transport network. For most networks, this means use of AES-128 in CCM mode, but this needs to be specified clearly in the applicability statement.


In terms of the lifetime of the keys, the opportunity to periodically change the encryption key increases the offered level of security for any given implementation. However, where strong cryptography is employed, physical, procedural, and logical data access protection considerations may have a more significant impact on cryptoperiod selection than algorithm and key size factors. Nevertheless, in general, shorter cryptoperiods, during which a single key is applied, will enhance security.


Given the mandatory protocol requirement to implement routing node authentication as part of routing integrity (see Section 8.2), key exchanges may be coordinated as part of the integrity verification process. This provides an opportunity to increase the frequency of key exchange and shorten the cryptoperiod as a complement to the key length and encryption algorithm required for a given application domain.


8.2. Integrity Features
8.2. 完整性特征

The integrity of routing information provides the basis for ensuring that the function of the routing protocol is achieved and maintained. To protect integrity, RPL must run either using only the secure versions of the messages or over a L2 that uses channel binding between node identity and transmissions.


Some L2 security mechanisms use a single key for the entire network, and these networks cannot provide a significant amount of integrity protection, as any node that has that key may impersonate any other node. This mode of operation is likely acceptable when an entire deployment is under the control of a single administrative entity.


Other L2 security mechanisms form a unique session key for every pair of nodes that needs to communicate; this is often called a per-link key. Such networks can provide a strong degree of origin authentication and integrity on unicast messages.


However, some RPL messages are broadcast, and even when per-node L2 security mechanisms are used, the integrity and origin authentication of broadcast messages cannot be as trusted due to the proliferation of the key used to secure them.


RPL has two specific options that are broadcast in RPL Control Messages: the DIO and the DODAG Information Solicitation (DIS). The purpose of the DIS is to cause potential parents to reply with a DIO, so the integrity of the DIS is not of great concern. The DIS may also be unicast.


The DIO is a critical piece of routing and carries many critical parameters. RPL provides for asymmetric authentication at L3 of the RPL Control Message carrying the DIO, and this may be warranted in some deployments. A node could, if it felt that the DIO that it had received was suspicious, send a unicast DIS message to the node in question, and that node would reply with a unicast DIS. Those messages could be protected with the per-link key.


8.3. Availability Features
8.3. 可用性特征

Availability of routing information is linked to system and network availability, which in the case of LLNs require a broader security view beyond the requirements of the routing entities. Where availability of the network is compromised, routing information availability will be accordingly affected. However, to specifically assist in protecting routing availability, nodes MAY:


o restrict neighborhood cardinality;

o 限制邻域基数;

o use multiple paths;

o 使用多条路径;

o use multiple destinations;

o 使用多个目的地;

o choose randomly if multiple paths are available;

o 如果有多条路径可用,则随机选择;

o set quotas to limit transmit or receive volume; and

o 设置配额以限制传输或接收量;和

o use geographic information for flow control.

o 使用地理信息进行流量控制。

8.4. Key Management
8.4. 密钥管理

The functioning of the routing security services requires keys and credentials. Therefore, even though it's not directly an RPL security requirement, an LLN MUST have a process for initial key and credential configuration, as well as secure storage within the associated devices. Anti-tampering SHOULD be a consideration in physical design. Beyond initial credential configuration, an LLN is also encouraged to have automatic procedures for the revocation and replacement of the maintained security credentials.


While RPL has secure modes, some modes are impractical without the use of public key cryptography, which is believed to be too expensive by many. RPL L3 security will often depend upon existing LLN L2 security mechanisms, which provide for node authentication but little in the way of node authorization.

虽然RPL有安全模式,但如果不使用公钥密码,某些模式是不切实际的,许多人认为公钥密码过于昂贵。RPL L3安全性通常依赖于现有的LLN L2安全机制,这些机制提供节点身份验证,但很少提供节点授权。

9. Security Considerations
9. 安全考虑

The analysis presented in this document provides security analysis and design guidelines with a scope limited to RPL. Security services are identified as requirements for securing RPL. The specific mechanisms to be used to deal with each threat is specified in link-Land deployment-specific applicability statements.

本文档中的分析提供了安全分析和设计指南,其范围仅限于RPL。安全服务被确定为保护RPL的要求。处理每种威胁所使用的具体机制在link Land deployment特定适用性声明中有详细说明。

10. References
10. 工具书类
10.1. Normative References
10.1. 规范性引用文件

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, <>.

[RFC2119]Bradner,S.,“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”,BCP 14,RFC 2119,1997年3月<>.

[RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005, <>.

[RFC4107]Bellovin,S.和R.Housley,“加密密钥管理指南”,BCP 107,RFC 4107,2005年6月<>.

[RFC6550] Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, March 2012, <>.

[RFC6550]温特,T.,图伯特,P.,布兰特,A.,许,J.,凯尔西,R.,列维斯,P.,皮斯特,K.,斯特鲁克,R.,瓦塞尔,JP.,和R.亚历山大,“RPL:低功耗和有损网络的IPv6路由协议”,RFC 65502012年3月<>.

[RFC6719] Gnawali, O. and P. Levis, "The Minimum Rank with Hysteresis Objective Function", RFC 6719, September 2012, <>.

[RFC6719]Gnawali,O.和P.Levis,“具有滞后目标函数的最小秩”,RFC 6719,2012年9月<>.

[RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, January 2014, <>.

[RFC7102]Vasseur,JP.,“低功耗和有损网络路由中使用的术语”,RFC 7102,2014年1月<>.

[ZigBeeIP] ZigBee Alliance, "ZigBee IP Specification", Public Document 15-002r00, March 2013.

[ZigBeeIP]ZigBee联盟,“ZigBee IP规范”,公开文件15-002r00,2013年3月。

10.2. Informative References
10.2. 资料性引用

[AceCharterProposal] Li, Kepeng., Ed., "Draft Charter V0.9c - Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environment Charter", Work in Progress, December 2013, < ACE_charter>.

[AceCharterProposal]李克鹏主编,“宪章草案V0.9c-受限环境宪章的认证和授权”,正在进行的工作,2013年12月< ACE\U章程>。

[HELLO] Park, S., "Routing Security in Sensor Network: HELLO Flood Attack and Defense", Work in Progress, draft-suhopark-hello-wsn-00, December 2005.


[IEEE.802.11] IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information Technology - Telecommunications and information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE Std 802.11-2012, March 2012, <>.

[IEEE.802.11]IEEE,“IEEE信息技术标准-系统间电信和信息交换-局域网和城域网-特定要求第11部分:无线局域网介质访问控制(MAC)和物理层(PHY)规范”,IEEE标准802.11-2012,2012年3月, <>.

[IEEE.802.15.4] IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part 15.4: Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs)", IEEE Std 802.15.4-2011, September 2011, <>.

[IEEE.802.15.4]IEEE,“局域网和城域网的IEEE标准-特定要求-第15.4部分:低速无线个人区域网(LR WPAN)”,IEEE标准802.15.4-2011,2011年9月<>.

[ISO.7498-2.1989] International Organization for Standardization, "Information processing systems - Open Systems Interconnection -- Basic Reference Model - Part 2: Security Architecture", ISO Standard 7498-2, 1989.


[Karlof2003] Karlof, C. and D. Wagner, "Secure Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks: Attacks and Countermeasures", Elsevier Ad Hoc Networks Journal, Special Issue on Sensor Network Applications and Protocols, 1(2):293-315, September 2003, < sensor-route-security.pdf>.

[Karlof2003]Karlof,C.和D.Wagner,“无线传感器网络中的安全路由:攻击和对策”,《Elsevier Ad Hoc Networks期刊》,传感器网络应用和协议专刊,1(2):293-315,2003年9月< 传感器路由安全性.pdf>。

[MESH-LINK] Kelsey, R., "Mesh Link Establishment", Work in Progress, draft-kelsey-intarea-mesh-link-establishment-06, May 2014.


[Myagmar2005] Myagmar, S., Lee, AJ., and W. Yurcik, "Threat Modeling as a Basis for Security Requirements", in Proceedings of the Symposium on Requirements Engineering for Information Security (SREIS'05), Paris, France pp. 94-102, August 2005.


[Perlman1988] Perlman, R., "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness", MIT LCS Tech Report, 429, August 1988.

[Perlman 1988]Perlman,R.,“具有拜占庭鲁棒性的网络层协议”,麻省理工学院LCS技术报告,4292988年8月。

[RFC2328] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998, <>.

[RFC2328]Moy,J.,“OSPF版本2”,STD 54,RFC 23281998年4月<>.

[RFC3067] Arvidsson, J., Cormack, A., Demchenko, Y., and J. Meijer, "TERENA'S Incident Object Description and Exchange Format Requirements", RFC 3067, February 2001, <>.

[RFC3067]Arvidsson,J.,Cormack,A.,Demchenko,Y.,和J.Meijer,“TERENA事件对象描述和交换格式要求”,RFC 3067,2001年2月<>.

[RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, September 2003, <>.

[RFC3610]Whiting,D.,Housley,R.,和N.Ferguson,“CBC-MAC(CCM)计数器”,RFC 36102003年9月<>.

[RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006, <>.

[RFC4593]Barbir,A.,Murphy,S.,和Y.Yang,“路由协议的一般威胁”,RFC 4593,2006年10月<>.

[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006, <>.

[RFC4732]Handley,M.,Rescorla,E.,和IAB,“互联网拒绝服务注意事项”,RFC 47322006年12月<>.

[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC 4949, August 2007, <>.

[RFC4949]Shirey,R.,“互联网安全词汇表,第2版”,RFC 49492007年8月<>.

[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008, <>.

[RFC5191]Forsberg,D.,Ohba,Y.,Patil,B.,Tschofenig,H.,和A.Yegin,“承载网络接入认证(PANA)的协议”,RFC 51912008年5月<>.

[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008, <>.

[RFC5216]Simon,D.,Aboba,B.和R.Hurst,“EAP-TLS认证协议”,RFC 52162008年3月<>.

[RFC5548] Dohler, M., Watteyne, T., Winter, T., and D. Barthel, "Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 5548, May 2009, <>.

[RFC5548]Dohler,M.,Watteyne,T.,Winter,T.,和D.Barthel,“城市低功率和有损网络的路由要求”,RFC 5548,2009年5月<>.

[RFC5673] Pister, K., Thubert, P., Dwars, S., and T. Phinney, "Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 5673, October 2009, <>.

[RFC5673]Pister,K.,Thubert,P.,Dwars,S.,和T.Phinney,“低功率和有损网络中的工业路由要求”,RFC 5673,2009年10月<>.

[RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010, <>.

[RFC5751]Ramsdell,B.和S.Turner,“安全/多用途Internet邮件扩展(S/MIME)版本3.2消息规范”,RFC 57512010年1月<>.

[RFC5826] Brandt, A., Buron, J., and G. Porcu, "Home Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 5826, April 2010, <>.

[RFC5826]Brandt,A.,Buron,J.,和G.Porcu,“低功率和有损网络中的家庭自动化路由要求”,RFC 5826,2010年4月<>.

[RFC5867] Martocci, J., De Mil, P., Riou, N., and W. Vermeylen, "Building Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 5867, June 2010, <>.

[RFC5867]Martocci,J.,De Mil,P.,Riou,N.,和W.Vermeylen,“低功率和有损网络中的楼宇自动化布线要求”,RFC 58672010年6月<>.

[RFC6192] Dugal, D., Pignataro, C., and R. Dunn, "Protecting the Router Control Plane", RFC 6192, March 2011, <>.

[RFC6192]Dugal,D.,Pignataro,C.,和R.Dunn,“保护路由器控制平面”,RFC 61922011年3月<>.

[RFC6574] Tschofenig, H. and J. Arkko, "Report from the Smart Object Workshop", RFC 6574, April 2012, <>.

[RFC6574]Tschofenig,H.和J.Arkko,“智能对象研讨会的报告”,RFC 6574,2012年4月<>.

[RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure, "TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple Addresses", RFC 6824, January 2013, <>.

[RFC6824]Ford,A.,Raiciu,C.,Handley,M.,和O.Bonaventure,“多地址多路径操作的TCP扩展”,RFC 68242013年1月<>.

[RFC7142] Shand, M. and L. Ginsberg, "Reclassification of RFC 1142 to Historic", RFC 7142, February 2014, <>.

[RFC7142]Shand,M.和L.Ginsberg,“将RFC 1142重新分类为历史”,RFC 7142,2014年2月<>.

[RFC7397] Gilger, J. and H. Tschofenig, "Report from the Smart Object Security Workshop", RFC 7397, November 2014, <>.

[RFC7397]Gilger,J.和H.Tschofenig,“智能对象安全研讨会报告”,RFC 7397,2014年11月<>.

[SmartObjectSecurityWorkshop] Klausen, T., Ed., "Workshop on Smart Object Security", March 2012, < SmartObjectSecurity>.

[SmartObjectSecurityWorkshop]Klausen,T.,Ed.,“智能对象安全研讨会”,2012年3月< SmartObjectSecurity>。

[SolaceProposal] Bormann, C., Ed., "Notes from the SOLACE ad hoc at IETF 85", November 2012, < mail-archive/web/solace/current/msg00015.html>.

[SolaceProposal]Bormann,C.,Ed.,“IETF 85上SOLACE特别会议记录”,2012年11月< 邮件存档/web/solace/current/msg00015.html>。

[Sybil2002] Douceur, J., "The Sybil Attack", First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, March 2002.


[Wan2004] Wan, T., Kranakis, E., and PC. van Oorschot, "S-RIP: A Secure Distance Vector Routing Protocol", in Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, pp. 103-119, June 2004.

[Wan2004]Wan,T.,Kranakis,E.,和PC.van Oorschot,“S-RIP:安全距离向量路由协议”,载于《第二届应用密码学和网络安全国际会议记录》,第103-119页,2004年6月。

[Yourdon1979] Yourdon, E. and L. Constantine, "Structured Design: Fundamentals of a Discipline of Computer Program and Systems Design", Yourdon Press, New York, Chapter 10, pp. 187-222, 1979.

[Yourdon 1979]Yourdon,E.和L.Constantine,“结构化设计:计算机程序和系统设计学科的基础”,Yourdon出版社,纽约,第10章,第187-222页,1979年。



The authors would like to acknowledge the review and comments from Rene Struik and JP Vasseur. The authors would also like to acknowledge the guidance and input provided by the ROLL Chairs, David Culler and JP Vasseur, and Area Director Adrian Farrel.

作者希望感谢Rene Struik和JP Vasseur的评论和评论。作者还想感谢滚动主席David Culler和JP Vasseur以及区域主任Adrian Farrel提供的指导和意见。

This document started out as a combined threat and solutions document. As a result of a series of security reviews performed by Steve Kent, the document was split up by ROLL Co-Chair Michael Richardson and Security Area Director Sean Turner as it went through the IETF publication process. The solutions to the threats are application and L2 specific and have, therefore, been moved to the relevant applicability statements.

本文档一开始是一份威胁和解决方案的综合文档。史蒂夫·肯特(Steve Kent)进行了一系列安全审查后,该文件在IETF发布过程中被ROLL联席主席迈克尔·理查森(Michael Richardson)和安全区域主任肖恩·特纳(Sean Turner)拆分。这些威胁的解决方案是针对应用程序和二级语言的,因此已转移到相关的适用性声明中。

Ines Robles and Robert Cragie kept track of the many issues that were raised during the development of this document.

Ines Robles和Robert Cragie记录了本文件编制过程中提出的许多问题。

Authors' Addresses


Tzeta Tsao Eaton's Cooper Power Systems Business 910 Clopper Rd., Suite 201S Gaithersburg, Maryland 20878 United States EMail:

Tzeta Tsao Eaton的库珀电力系统公司美国马里兰州盖瑟斯堡市克洛珀路910号201S室20878电子邮件

Roger K. Alexander Eaton's Cooper Power Systems Business 910 Clopper Rd., Suite 201S Gaithersburg, Maryland 20878 United States EMail:

Roger K.Alexander Eaton的库珀电力系统公司,地址:美国马里兰州盖瑟斯堡市克洛珀路910号201S室,邮编:20878电子邮件

Mischa Dohler CTTC Parc Mediterrani de la Tecnologia, Av. Canal Olimpic S/N Castelldefels, Barcelona 08860 Spain EMail:

Misha Dohler CTTC Mediterrani de la Tecnologia公园,Av。巴塞罗那卡斯特尔德费尔斯运河奥林匹克公园S/N 08860西班牙电子邮件:米沙。

Vanesa Daza Universitat Pompeu Fabra P/ Circumval.lacio 8, Oficina 308 Barcelona 08003 Spain EMail:

蓬佩乌法布拉大学瓦内萨·达扎P/Circival.lacio 8,Oficina 308巴塞罗那08003西班牙电子邮件:瓦内萨。

Angel Lozano Universitat Pompeu Fabra P/ Circumval.lacio 8, Oficina 309 Barcelona 08003 Spain EMail:

蓬佩法布拉天使洛扎诺大学P/Circival.lacio 8,Oficina 309巴塞罗那08003西班牙电子邮件:Angel。

Michael Richardson (editor) Sandelman Software Works 470 Dawson Avenue Ottawa, ON K1Z5V7 Canada EMail: